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THE VALUE OF LIVE MUSIC 
Simon Frith  
 
From April 2008 until April 2011 I directed a research project on live music 
in Britain.1 We are now writing up our findings,2 and since February 2012 we 
have had funding for a follow-up project, designed to establish ongoing links 
between academic researchers, the live music industry and the wider 
public.3 
The original research project was organized around an investigation of 
the business of live music promotion and a crucial part of our method was 
interviewing. We talked to more than 100 promoters, from the MD of Live 
Nation in the UK and such big names as Harvey Goldsmith to local club 
owners and enthusiasts. We covered all types of music (including classical) 
— which is one reason why our findings will fill three books. 
One of my roles in the research team is to present our work to the live 
music industry itself, whether by attending their trade events and writing 
for their trade papers or by inviting them to seminars we organise. Such 
»knowledge exchange« (to use current academic jargon) is not without its 
problems and two kinds of miscommunication between university-based 
researchers and live music industry players particular interest me (and have 
informed the design of our follow up project). 
First, we apparently have quite different interpretations of a shared 
phrase, »the value of live music«. Their take is, it seems, straightforwardly 
economic: the value of live music can be measured by how much money 
people are prepared to pay for it. Our approach, by contrast, is more philo-
sophical (or up our own backsides, as the industry would say): what is it 
that people think they are paying for? What exactly do they value? I'm not 
                                                            
1 See http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/livemusicproject. The project, ›The 
promotion of live music in the UK — a historical, cultural and institutional ana-
lysis‹, was funded by the AHRC (AH/F009437/1). 
2  The first of a three volume history of live music in Britain, From Dance Hall to 
the 100 Club, covering 1950-1967, will be published by Ashgate in 2013. 
3 ›Developing knowledge exchange in the live music sector‹ (AH/J00474X1/1), for 




sure the differences here are quite what they seem and I will come back to 
this, just noting here that it is only in the record business that you hear 
executives bemoaning the fact that »people don't value music any more« 
(meaning that they won't pay sufficiently for CDs or downloads). Promoters 
have, on the whole, a subtler understanding of the value of music in 
people's everyday lives and how this effects their spending decisions. 
Second, it was soon apparent to us that current promoters are not much 
interested in the past of their business (though they do enjoy reminiscing 
about the old days). They are, understandably, far more concerned about 
the future. A couple of years ago I was therefore asked to write my own 
account of what the music world would look like in 2025, and to present 
this for discussion at MaMA, the annual Paris-based European music business 
event. I will come back to my predictions at the end of this paper. I need to 
begin, though, by saying something about how I reached them. 
My starting points were that all predictions of the future are wrong and 
that the best way to look forwards is to look back or, more precisely, to 
look at the futures that were predicted in the past. Two such scenarios are 
relevant here. 
The first scenario was that live music had no future. As Glenn Gould 
famously wrote in High Fidelity in 1966:  
»In an unguarded moment some months ago, I predicted that the public 
concert as we know it today would no longer exist a century hence, that its 
functions would have been entirely taken over by the electronic media. It had 
not occurred to me that this statement represented a particularly radical 
pronouncement. Indeed, I regarded it almost as self-evident truth« (Gould 
1966: 47). 
This was the future that was assumed when I started researching the music 
industry in the 1970s. Evidence for this prognosis was provided by both 
economists and sociologists. In 1966, the same year that Glenn Gould pre-
dicted the end of the public concert, William J. Baumol and William G. 
Bowen published Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma. Baumol and 
Bowen's analysis of »the cost-disease« that afflicted the performing arts was 
highly influential on subsequent cultural economists (indeed, their book was 
in effect the founding statement for the field).4 Its argument can be sum-
marized (for non economists) quite simply. A performing art like live music 
faces necessary limits to both its economies of scale and its labour producti-
vity. On the one hand, live concerts can only take place in a specific place 
                                                            
4  See, for example, the special issue of the Journal of Cultural Economics (20/3, 
1996) on the book's 30th anniversary. 
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at a specific time to a finite audience (which has to be in hearing distance); 
on the other hand, musical works have a fixed labour input: a quartet 
cannot be played by a trio. The result is that the performing arts cannot 
compete for leisure spending with the mass mediated arts in terms of price. 
Concerts either have to be priced at levels which limit audiences to a 
declining number of the wealthy, or they have to be subsidized in some 
way. (Baumol and Bowman were primarily concerned with concert music 
and opera although their arguments are generally valid.)  
Meanwhile, sociologists (and social historians) were documenting the 
effects of the rise of recording on public and private listening habits. They 
documented, for example, how live musicians were progressively replaced 
by recorded musicians in cinemas5, hotels, dance halls, on radio and tele-
vision and, most recently, even in the »live« performance of musicals and 
ballet. In 1947 the Musicians' Union's assistant general secretary, Hardie 
Ratcliffe, told readers of Melody Maker, the paper for dance band 
musicians, that »We Must Beat the Record!« 
»A show-down will come before long. Musicians throughout the world — 
particularly those providing dance music — will be forced to fight broad-
casting and recording interests. The issue will be whether musicians are to 
control the recorded music they make or leave control to those with the 
money-bags. Musicians must beat the record — or go out of business!« 
(Ratcliffe 1947: 4).  
Unfortunately for Ratcliffe the record won. From the mid-1950s an increas-
ing percentage of consumer spending on music was devoted to recording; a 
decreasing percentage to live performances. By 1966 in the popular music 
world, at least, »music consumption« meant »record consumption«. When I 
began researching The Sociology of Rock in the mid-1970s I took for granted 
that the music industry was organised around the record industry, which 
was by then clearly central to the economics of live music too: rock gigs 
were primarily organised and financed to promote record sales. It was 
common sense, in short, to assume that the future of live music was 
dependent either on high cultural policy and the provision of state support 
to preserve Europe's classical music heritage and elite musical art scene or 
else on the promotional policies of the record industry. 
Move on 25 years to the early 2000s, when we first got interested in 
researching the live music sector. There was by now, in the digital age, a 
quite different future scenario: live music was now the future; it was the 
                                                            
5  In the early 1920s two thirds of Britain's professional musicians were employed 




recording industry that was supposedly doomed. Various economic develop-
ments were cited to support this suggestion: 
• From the mid-1990s ticket prices started rising more rapidly than infla-
tion. Concerts became more expensive than CDs (previously promoters 
had tended to peg ticket prices to CD prices). 
• In terms of consumers' »wallet share«, expenditure on records now be-
gan a steady decrease. 
• The impact of downloading and file sharing on record pricing and sales 
meant that the ratio of musicians' earnings from live performance to 
their earnings from record sales began a steady rise.6  
• By the turn of the century a new kind of international live music 
business had emerged. In the early 2000s, for example, all the major 
promotional/venue companies in Britain were taken over by such global 
players as Live Nation and AEG.  
By the end of the 2000s annual expenditure in Britain on live music was 
greater than expenditure on all forms of recorded music and the live music 
business had become the biggest employer in the British music economy.7 
Globally (following its merger with Ticketmaster), Live Nation can now 
plausibly be described as the world's biggest music company (only the 
Universal Music Group has a comparable turnover). The common sense sug-
gestion has become that the music industry means the live music industry. 
Live music industry decisions are certainly central now to the economics of 
recording: if bands once toured to promote album sales, they now release 
albums to promote their concerts. 
In twenty years time the assumptions here will probably seem as mis-
placed as the assumptions about the future of live music in the 1970s seem 
to us today, but I'm less interested in the inevitability of false predictions 
than in thinking about what we can learn from them. It could be suggested, 
for example, that the problem of the doom scenario was that by focusing so 
rigorously on the economics of live music it neglected the effects of music's 
ideological value. After all, »the concert hall« experience has always been 
the ideal of the classical recording industry (which it sought to make 
available in the living room) and the rock world, like the folk and jazz 
                                                            
6  One effect was record company exploration of so-called 360º degree deals in 
which they took their share of live concert revenue. Another was that HMV (a 
record retailer) took over the Mama group (a venue chain). 
7 See, for example, »UK live revenues surpass record Sales.« In: Music Week, 17th 
March 2009. http://www.musicweek.com/news/read/uk-live-revenues-surpass-
record-sales/039558 (accessed 19th September 2012). 
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worlds, has always treated the live show as the most authentic setting for 
musical expression.  
One could argue, in short, that the cultural meaning of music remained 
rooted in live performance even at the height of record company domi-
nation of the music industry and, more generally, I now believe that my 
working assumption in The Sociology of Rock that music was a rights 
industry was wrong or, at least, misleading. Rather, it is better understood 
as a service industry. Most musicians make a living selling services rather 
than exploiting rights, and live performance is the service they mostly sell — 
to a wide range of clients, not just to concert promoters and club owners, 
but also to record, film, television, advertising, videogame, and other me-
dia companies, to cruise ships and casinos, to a variety of private customers 
for music at weddings, funerals, bar mitzvahs and other such events. And 
such music making goes on despite the cost disease. 
That said, it could equally well be argued that present day optimists 
about the future of the live music sector are ignoring the economic 
symptoms that the cost disease describes (and there is increasing evidence 
that the live music »boom« anyway peaked in 2010).8 Our research project 
was designed in part to examine how British promoters have addressed 
these cost problems historically and it's worth indicating here some of their 
solutions: 
The most significant is probably the music festival. In the European 
classical music world, festivals can be dated back to the eighteenth century 
and by the early nineteenth century many British cities had annual »musical 
festivals«. The first Edinburgh Musical Festival, for example, held between 
30th October and 5th November 1815, featured seven concerts in two venues 
with 150 performers. It brought in visitors — »the concourse of strangers 
towards Edinburgh was unexampled«, as a report of the time put it, adding 
that »all the lodgings round the city were occupied« (McLarty 2010: 8). 
(There was already, it seems, an association being made between a music 
festival, the attraction of visitors, and the local economy.) But the explo-
sion of classical music festivals was a post-1945 phenomenon. Bruno Frey 
(1994) cites figures suggesting that there were at least 1000 and possibly as 
many as 2000 such annual festivals in Europe by the end of the 1970s 
(numbers vary according to what is defined as a festival); in Britain regular 
classical, folk, jazz and blues festivals were well established by the end of 
the 1950s, and rock festivals have been a familiar part of the calendar since 
                                                            
8  The best source of UK music industry data is PRS for Music, which publishes 
annual economic reports. Copyright Societies in other countries also provide 




the 1960s, although the huge increase in the number and variety of popular 
music festivals has been a twenty first century phenomenon.  
Festivals offer various solutions to the cost disease. In terms of eco-
nomies of scale outdoor festivals at least can reach much larger audiences 
than is possible in an indoor venue (especially as audience members can be 
mobile between different stages). In terms of productivity, the investment 
in staging infrastructure — sound and lights, security, promotion and publi-
city, ticketing, etc. — is sufficient for a much larger number of performers 
and performances than is possible for a show in a theatre and, as Frey 
points out, festivals also tend to use contracted freelance workers (rather 
than concert halls' salaried permanent staff) which cuts labour costs.  
Festivals also have a value that is qualitatively different from that of 
routine concerts and which cannot simply be measured as a quantitative 
accumulation of performances. Many festivals, that is to say (Glastonbury is 
a good example), have established themselves as »leisure experiences« 
involving something more than music. A rock festival like Scotland's T in the 
Park thus routinely sells out before it has announced its line-up; classical 
musical festivals, as Frey (1994: 37) documents, are sold as part of all-in 
luxury holidays. A festival ticket may well offer the consumer good value for 
money (in terms of the number of acts seen) but festival goers are also 
willing to invest much more into time, travel and subsistence costs than 
they would be willing to pay as an add-on to a workaday gig. For a promoter 
a festival is thus an essential part of their portfolio — it has a much higher 
profit margin than a tour and, even more importantly, offers a sure return 
on the investment. 
A second way of achieving both economies of scale and an increase in 
productivity is by putting on a succession of performances in the same 
venue, as »a run«. Instead of an act touring from town to town, audiences 
are encouraged to take a trip to a single venue where the act will play for 
many nights. This was the entertainment model developed in Las Vegas by 
Frank Sinatra, Elvis Presley and, more recently, Celine Dion, who from 2002 
played five nights a week at The Colosseum at Caesars Palace, for an 
astonishing five years. Promoters can invest sufficiently in a single space to 
stage a spectacular show that can command higher ticket prices as well as 
reaching a much bigger audience who, like festival-goers, may well treat 
the musical act as just part of a broader leisure experience (involving a 
night in an up-market hotel, fine dining, and a flutter on the roulette 
wheel). This is also, of course, the way in which musicals work (and UK pro-
moters have developed a strategy of moving such shows as the Sound of 
Music to provincial cities for extended runs after their London dates have 
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come to an end). In recent years the promotion of concert runs has moved 
beyond traditional showbiz and variety to rock. AEG, for example, booked 
Prince for 21 nights into its O2 venue in London, and it's worth noting here 
that unlike the tour, neither the festival nor the extended single venue run 
lend themselves easily to the established timetable of record promotion. 
Their rise is both an effect of and a solution to the decline of record 
industry power. 
Other promoter strategies have a much longer history. The advantage of 
owning venues and developing venue chains (like Live Nation) was under-
stood by music hall promoters in the mid-nineteenth century and led to 
Britain's first large entertainment corporations. The creation of centrally 
owned performance networks both increased promoters' bargaining power in 
their dealings with artists and their agents and added to their ways of 
making money out of live shows. Music hall owners took their profits from 
their sales of food and drink and cloakroom services.9 Since the 1960s 
British club owners have also maximized returns from their space by 
combining bands and deejays, live shows and club nights.  
Music promoters have understood the economic significance of ticketing 
for an equally long time — certainly since the end of the eighteenth century 
— and the point to stress here is that the history of ticketing is tied up with 
the history of technology (for ticket buyers and sellers the most significant 
twentieth century invention was undoubtedly the credit card). In the live 
music sector the most important effect of digital technology has therefore 
been the rise of Ticketmaster. (Compare the way we now buy tickets 
instantly, at home, at the click of a computer key, with the time and 
trouble of physical queuing, preparing and sending off a stamped addressed 
envelope, or waiting on hold for hours for a phone line to be free.) But 
ticketing matters economically not for its convenience for customers but as 
an additional source of income for promoters. The provision of ticketing 
services (for around 30% of the ticket price) brings in profits whether or not 
a particular gig sells enough tickets to cover other costs. 
Finally (as various critics of Baumol and Bowman have pointed out) in an 
era of mass media the physical restriction on live audience size is less 
absolute than it might seem. From early in the BBC's history, for example, 
the Proms season was a live music promotion that was simultaneously 
designed for a mass wireless audience, and broadcasters have been 
important for the economics of the live music business ever since. Digital 
technology currently allows live performances to be streamed (to mobile 
                                                            




phones, for instance) while the New York Metropolitan Opera House has 
developed an influential model of global simulcasts, live shows as available 
to cinema audiences round the world as to the people actually sitting in the 
limited number of seats in the Met itself. 
What I've been describing here is music promoters' enterprise in using 
technological, industrial and cultural change as an opportunity to increase 
their returns. It remains the case, however, that these are restricted solu-
tions to live music's cost problems. Most events continue to happen without 
these income streams, and for these shows production costs continue to 
exceed the returns from ticket sales at the prices most consumers are 
willing to pay. The percentage of live shows that result in the multimillion 
dollar earnings reported each year by Pollstar is probably even smaller than 
the percentage of record releases that went platinum in the heyday of the 
record industry. And this situation has only been exacerbated by the decline 
of record company tour support. The fact also remains that the economic 
loss on most live shows is borne to a disproportionate extent by the perfor-
mers, whose fees may or may not cover their costs for a particular show but 
certainly don't repay their investment over time in their careers.  
Live music promoters and performers, in short, continue to depend on 
some kind of subsidy or alternative revenue stream to supplement their 
returns from the box office, and the state (at both national and local level) 
remains an important source of subsidy and not just for classical and art 
music events (though most of these wouldn't happen without public 
funding). The cost of building and maintaining municipal stadiums, an 
essential resource for rock and pop promoters, is mostly borne by local 
authorities, for example, and most music festivals depend on public re-
sources (space, infrastructure) provided at no or low prices. 
Over the last fifty years state support has come to be matched by 
commercial sponsorship of various kinds. Brewers, in particular, have been 
key players in the live music scene — if Tennents were to change its brand-
ing policy, for example, many promoters in Scotland would find it difficult 
to survive. For musicians (particularly those in specialist markets, though 
this is beginning to be true for rock performers too) gig sales of records and 
other merchandise make a significant addition to box office income. The 
decline of record retail has meant the development of the live concert as a 
kind of mobile music stall, live and recorded sounds equally available. 
I've been trying to provide here a summary account of the dynamics of 
change in the promotional business, by examining the ways in which 
promoters respond to the economic problems they face by using new 
technologies and meeting new consumer demands as well as by drawing on 
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established business strategies and connections. In order to offer a credible 
account of the future we need a clear understanding of how change works. 
And there is a final descriptive point to be made from this perspective. The 
problems that have emerged from the most recent period of change are the 
problems that the music industry will be addressing in moving to the next 
period. Our research identifies three in particular. 
 
 
The problem of investment and career 
development  
 
The economics of the record industry are organised around the mass 
production, reproduction and distribution of things. As in other publishing 
industries, the huge profits on best sellers support investment in any num-
ber of poor sellers (the conventional wisdom in the rock era was that record 
companies issued 1 hit to 10 misses). Between the mid-1960s and late 1990s 
musicians' careers depended on this kind of cross-subsidy. It is not a model 
that promoters can adopt. The large profits made on big name tours go 
primarily to the artists (and their managers); they are not invested in new 
or as yet »unpopular« acts.10 It is not clear, in current economic conditions, 
what will replace record company investment. (Those acts that have been 
successful in putting together sufficient funds from fan investment via the 
Web have all so far been established acts, names that were known to fans 
because of earlier label deals.) Given that the most successful live bands 
nowadays are »heritage acts«, whose audiences are drawn from a long 
nurtured fan base, the question becomes how will new acts develop such 
support without any traditional record company investment. A model in 
which large acts drive the profitability of the live sector thus allowing 
promoters to lose money on lesser known acts is not sustainable unless the 
latter can be supported for long enough to become the former.11 
From this perspective live music promotion has to be seen as a long not 
a short term business. Promoters need to build audiences, to look after per-
formers at all stages of their career and, to this end, the live music sector 
has its own necessary eco-system. It depends on flourishing local live scenes 
as well large global players. When the sector rationalises in organisational 
                                                            
10  Some promoters do now subsidise tours of new acts in return for long term 
contracts, but they don't have the resources to invest in such acts' recording, 
promotion or other development costs. 
11  Major promoters aim to cover the costs of 25% of their shows, though the actual 




terms (and at the top end moves to oligopoly), as it has done over the last 
decade, the economic challenge is to maintain a balance of large and small 
promotional enterprise. The live music industry may now be dominated by a 
small number of global corporations, but its health depends on a continuing 
variety of local spaces (various in terms of size, atmosphere and booking 
policy) and there is increasing evidence that such venues are, in fact, 
becoming less sustainable.12  
One effect of a chain-owned venue opening in a medium-sized city, for 
example, is that it becomes the venue at which all medium-sized acts will 
appear. It makes better sense for their agents to do a single deal for a num-
ber of performances across the country than to do different deals, venue by 
venue. Local promoters who could previously use such acts as to offset 
losses on local or upcoming bands, can no longer do so and their business 
thus becomes much more precarious. In Sheffield, for example, the Uni-
versity Students Union, long the meeting place for local independent rock 
fans and performers, has not been able to compete for hit acts with the 
newly opened Sheffield Academy; it has had to switch its booking attention 
to comedy. Historically one can see a recurring cycle of venue organisation: 
consolidation and centralisation is followed eventually by bankruptcy, as 
new local venues (quicker to adapt to changes in musical tastes and 
practices) begin to flourish before, in turn consolidating and centralising. 
 
 
The problem of regulation  
 
Unlike the record business, the live music business is subject to a complex 
variety of regulation — the health, safety and potential nuisance of public 
gatherings has long been a matter of public interest. Live music thus in-
volves politics on a daily basis, as is clear in the history of the UK's licensing 
laws. Two issues are currently of particular significance. First, governments' 
increasing concern about alcohol misuse (particularly among young people) 
is clearly a threat to the continuing interdependence of the live music and 
the drinks industries. Second, promoters face increasing public concern 
about noise pollution, whether in terms of the health and safety of the live 
music work force or the peace of mind of a venue's residential neighbours. 
It seems reasonable to predict that over the next decade live music pro-
moters will have to wean themselves from their dependence on alcohol. 
(This is not impossible, by the way. The development of a new kind of youth 
                                                            
12 See, for example, http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2012/may/26/rock-music-
venues-bust-britain?INTCMP=SRCH (accessed 12th September 2012). 
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music in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, the so-called British beat boom, 
took place largely in venues that were not licensed to sell alcohol.) Noise 
anxieties will be harder to resolve, however. They are likely to become a 
matter for planning laws and the organisation of urban space, for policy 
decisions that are not under promoters' control. The underlying issue here, 
though, is that the more musical spaces are regulated — made orderly and 
»quiet« — the less appealing they become for audiences who want, precise-
ly, a noisy night out.  
 
 
The problem of value,  
a return to the start ing point  
 
In the present economic situation, people have less money to spend on 
anything. It is arguable that live music becomes more valuable to people in 
a recession, a source of good times amidst the bad, and our research does 
suggests that live music is valued as an experience that is somehow un-
touched by market forces. But this way of enjoying music is threatened if 
concerts become over-commoditised, venues too standardised, the exploita-
tion of the consumer too obvious. People »illegally« download not just 
because they want music for free but because in the 1990s CDs prices came 
to be seen as a »rip off«. Promoters will have problems if ticket prices are 
seen similarly. The value of live music involves experiences and beliefs on 
which people may not be interested in putting a price. In our research we 
were particularly interested by the central role of the enthusiast in British 
music history, the promoter who is not concerned with profit but simply 
wants to share music, to build a new audience/market (that commercial 
promoters can then exploit). There is a clear danger that as the live sector 
becomes more economically rational it will destroy the irrationality on 
which its cultural value to some extent depends. Interestingly even the 
most commercial promoters we spoke to were aware of this. A »good« gig 
for them (as for audiences and performers) is not the gig that makes the 
most (or even any) profit but the gig that delivers on the promise of live 
music, that makes everyone present feel that presence so intensely that 
nothing else seems to matter. 
To conclude, then. Given our understanding of the dynamics of change 
in the live music sector and the problems it presently faces, what can we 
predict for the future of music? 




• People will still express and understand themselves through music. 
• People will still make and listen to music together. 
• People will still dance to music. 
• People will still try to make money out of music. 
• Music will still be necessary for public and private entertainment. 
• Music that gave pleasure in the past will still give pleasure in the future. 
• There will be new technological ways of storing, sharing and hearing 
music that we can't yet imagine.  
And some things we can sensibly guess: 
By 2025 there will be no stadium gigs. Economically and aesthetically they 
will long have been thought pointless. The Rolling Stones and U2 will hang 
on to the model but even they will finally have to give up and stadium rock 
won't be the object of nostalgia. Uncomfortable, poor sight and sound lines, 
tedious travel and car park queues — who would go back to that? As people's 
willingness to pay high prices (and all the add-ons) for such gigs declines 
(and state funding cuts means a lack of resources for stadium maintenance) 
the stadium show will no longer be an economic proposition. Live Nation 
and Ticketmaster will inevitably go bust (one can't run a successful live 
music business from a corporate headquarters indefinitely) while continuing 
developments in mobile phone and payment technology will make ticketing 
an entirely personal act/audience transaction, with no need of third person 
ticketing (or secondary ticketing) services. The large venues that will be 
flourishing in 2025 will be organised on the model of the London Dome — 
smaller, flexible, comfortable spaces, in which bands can settle for a live 
season and in which music will be only one of many kinds of entertainment. 
There will still be festivals.  
By 2025, though, there will be no record shops, but then there will be 
no record companies either. There will be tracks and albums but they won't 
be funded, published, promoted or distributed in physical form by com-
panies on the model of EMI, Universal, etc. Music will no longer be treated 
as an asset. It will be, rather (as it has always been) a service, for which 
musicians will be paid at the point of delivery. A new kind of large music 
company will emerge, based not on the ownership of rights but the packag-
ing of services, whether musicians for weddings or the provision of ever 
more sophisticated »apps« for the various new sorts of personal computer/ 
communications devices. Such companies will bring together in one place 
the old roles of artist management, music agency and concert promotion 
with a new expertise in music placement and will function as brokers 
between musical supply and demand. A music economy built round services 
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rather than assets does not need musicians to sign long-term contracts and 
will shift the way consumers think about music, not as an object (record, 
song) to be possessed but as an experience (of which music might be only 
one part) to be enjoyed. This will be worth paying for but not as a single 
sort of transaction (buying a record or a ticket) but as a whole series of dif-
ferent transactions and the result will be a fragmented rather than a mass 
market. The era of the global superstar will die with the Rolling Stones. A 
musical career will be more localised, more erratic, more humble.  
In the 2025 economy of commercial musical services the model for 
what, in the era of the musical product, were called distribution and 
promotion will be radio and, more specifically, BBC Radio. The BBC has 
established radio services through which a great variety of music (live and 
recorded) is permanently available on a great variety of digital outlets and 
devices over which the listener has a great deal of control in terms of how 
and when they listen. These services are paid for by a license fee, which 
enables the musicians involved to be directly rewarded according to how 
much and often their work is used, and are crucial for the construction of 
musical communities, audiences sharing tastes determined by musical 
rather than commercial judgements. Inspired by the BBC model, a number 
of successful music providing companies will follow the pioneering if short-
lived on-line service, Spotify (which became over-dependent on record com-
pany support).  
By 2025 there will be three distinctive musical worlds, which, in busi-
ness terms, will be organised by different kinds of company and entre-
preneur: the dance music world, organised around the provision of sounds 
and spaces for dancers; the talent music world, organised around the 
provision of performers for visual media entertainment shows and songs for 
adverts, soundtracks, private pa systems and shopping malls; and the art 
music world, organised around the ideology of music as art, something up-
lifting and transcendent, a source of national pride and an activity requiring 
state educational and financial investment. Such ideology will be not only 
be applied to classical or »academic« music. »Art« music will include folk, 
jazz, and rock music; and the album, on the one hand, and the concert, on 
the other, will still be seen as the forms most appropriate to music as art. 
State subsidies will be directed accordingly, to acts, venues and music 
service companies alike (a necessary substitute for the now banned alcohol 
company support).  
By 2025 IASPM will be devoted entirely to such art music and will have 
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This paper suggests that ›the value of live music‹ may be defined in two ways: 
economically, live music treated as a source of income and profit, or culturally, 
live music experienced as something that is valuable because it can't be monetised. 
Most analyses of the live music sector focus on its economic value. The orthodox 
view from the 1950s was that the live music industry was suffering from an 
incurable ›cost disease‹ and live music promotion thus became entirely subordinate 
to and financially dependent on the recorded music sector. Since the 1990s, how-
ever, the economics of the record industry has been undermined by digital techno-
logy while the live sector has apparently flourished. Both these accounts of the live 
music business are flawed. They take too little account of live music's cultural 
value and underestimate promoters' entrepreneurial ingenuity. 
 
